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In recent years the tort liability of the owner of a family automo-
bile has, by judicial decision and legislative enactment, undoubtedly
been extended beyond that responsibility imposed upon him by strict
common law rules. In this connection much has been written on the
"Family Purpose Doctrine," and it would seem that the saturation
point has been reached. As a possible justification for any further
contribution on the subject of the family automobile, it seemed to the
writer that it might prove of interest to indicate how the courts, in
the light of a pressing social need, have gradually developed and justi-
fied an enlarged liability on the part of the automobile owner. Legis-
lative activity along this line will also be noted, briefly.
As a general proposition-nothing else appearing-no one is re-
sponsible for the act or omission of another.' However, with the
increasing complexity of our social, economic, and industrial life,
human relationsfiips have correspondingly become more complex and
difficult of adjustment, and the courts in the proper administration of
justice have recognized the need for holding one person responsible
for the acts of another under certain circumstances. Hence the de-
velopment of the doctrine of respondeat superior whereby the master
becomes responsible to third persons for the acts of his servant in
the course of his employment or the principal for the deeds of his
agent when the latter is acting within the scope of the agency.
The advent of the automobile as a new means of transportation
has clearly emphasized the importance of vicarious liability. Pos-
sibly no other single invention in the history of the world has so
revolutionized the work of the courts,-cluttering the dockets with
numerous personal injury and property damage suits, and rendering
increasingly difficult the administration of justice-as has the inven-
tion of the automobile.
At first automobiles were few in number; they would run only at
a moderate rate of speed, and were generally operated, because of
their very novelty, by the owner himself or perhaps by his regularly
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. This article
was prepared partly under the direction of Professor Walter F. Dodd of the
Yale Law School.
'1 SHEARMAN AND REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE (6th ed. 1913) §144.
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employed chauffeur. Under such conditions the courts had very little
difficulty in determining liability for negligent use; they needed
only to apply the well-known rules of one's responsibility for his own
negligent acts or of the master's liability for the negligent acts of his
servant or agent, under the general doctrine of respondeat superior.
However, the prodigious growth in recent years in the number
of machines together with their increased size, weight and speed, and
the infliction of serious injury and death to an alarming extent
through their operation by financially irresponsible persons--espe-
cially by members of families using them for their own personal
pleasure and convenience-these factors have raised a new problem
for the courts to deal with, that of determining who should be liable
for the wrongful acts of these irresponsible persons.
No trouble has been experienced by the courts in placing liability
when the relationship of master and servant or of agency can be
shown clearly to exist, as where it can be proved that in driving the
car a member of the car owner's family was about the business or in
the employment of the master or father in the use of the car at the
time the accident occurred. 2 The old category of respondeat superior
relieves the courts of any embarrassment in such situations.
The real difficulty lies in this situation: The bead of a family
purchases an automobile for the pleasure and convenience of his wife
and children. He either expressly or impliedly permits them to use
the car for their own purposes whenever they see fit to do so. What
is the liability of the owner of the automobile when a member of the
family negligently injures a third person while driving the car entirely
for his own pleasure or that of his friends, or while about his own
business? Should it make any difference in the liability of the
owner, if, at the time the accident occurs, one member of the family
is driving another member of the family? Should the responsibility
of one person for the negligent acts of another be extended to hold
the purchaser of the family automobile liable under such circum-
stances ?
How may the courts meet this difficulty and solve the problem?
Three possible avenues of procedure present themselves for con-
sideration: first, that the courts should attempt gradually to enlarge
the car owner's liability by the use and application of existing legal
formulae, rules, and principles; second, that they might frankly
' See Erlick v. Heis, 193 Ala. 669, 69 So. 530 (1915) ; Smith v. Jordan, 211Mass. 269, 97 N. E. 761 (1912).
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recognize the existence of a new and pressing problem which calls
for the creation and establishment of a new tort liability of one person
for the acts of another; third, that the courts play hands off and leave
the whole problem to the Legislature for solution.
The second of these suggested solutions is possible but not proba-
ble. A review of the authorities will disclose the fact that, although
the courts have realized that the family use of the automobile has
raised a serious problem in the administration of justice, yet they
have not clearly and frankly created a new tort liability as sutch which,
will make the owner liable for the negligent use of his car regardless
of whether or not the person using the car was the owner's agent or
servant at the time the accident occurred. This may be explainable
on several grounds. It must be remembered that a court never has
the whole issue before it at any one given time; it is passing on the
fact situation of one particular case and is writing the law for that
particular fact situation. It must be governed largely by what it has
decided in the past upon similar or analogous facts. The develop-
ment of a legal principle is slow and the court must of necessity take
short and gradual steps in working it out. A court in passing on the
tort liability of the owner of an automobile in 1908 could not possibly
foresee the necessity for holding the owner absolutely liable for the
negligent acts of members of his family who were merely driving the
car with the owner's permission or consent. The necessity for such
action has gradually become more apparent from the almost universal
use of the automobile as a family vehicle and the many deaths and
injuries to others resulting from such use by minors or dependents
in the owner's family who were financially irresponsible. It must be
borne in mind also that a court in writing an opinion in a particular
case is writing for publication and it must justify its position in the
eyes of the bar and the public. There is therefore a tendency for
the courts to stick to established legal principles as a basis for their
decisions.3
It is fairly obvious, then, that we may eliminate from our con-
sideration the second possible line of procedure that might be fol-
lowed by the courts and proceed to determine how they have handled
the problem in the light of the first and third possibilities.
'The recent and growing use of the memorandum opinion, by which a case
is decided and no reasons given for the decision, tends to relieve the courts of
the burden of justification and to give them more freedom in reaching a de-
sirable result.
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With the growth of necessity for judicial action in the fixing of
Tesponsibility for the negligent use of the family automobile when
the member of the family so using the car is unable to answer in
,damages to the injured party, it seems but natural that the courts
should attempt gradually to enlarge the car owner's liability by the
use of definitely fixed and recognized legal principles. We shall en-
'deavor, in the discussion which follows, to indicate what steps they
have taken in the development of a legal doctrine by which the car
,owner's liability has been extended so as to hold him responsible for
the negligent operation of his car by a member of his family even
though the driver of the car at the time of the accident was engaged
in pleasure or business entirely his own.
Upon some phases of the problem the courts are pretty well
agreed. It is well settled that the owner of an automobile is not liable
because of mere ownership of the car,4 though at least one court has
held that proof of ownership raises a presumption that the car was
being used at the direction of and in the business of the owner when
the accident occurred. 5 Nor is he liable merely because of the marital
or parental relationship which he bears to members of the family
using the car.8 Of course this does not preclude the possibility that
as to third persons, the minor child or other member of the family
may by particular arrangement become the servant of the car owner,
and this without agreement for compensation.7
It is also well established by a majority of the decisions that an
automobile is not inherently a dangerous instrumentality so that its
owner is liable for injuries to travelers on the highways inflicted
while the car was being driven by another, irrespective of the rela-
tionship of master and servant or principal and agent.8 The courts,
'Linville v. Nissen, 162 N. C. 95, 77 S. E. 1096 (1913) ; Hays v. Hogan 273
Mo. 1, 200 S. W. 286, L. R. A. 1918 C. 715 (1917).
'Birch v. Abercrombie, 74 Wash. 486, 133 Pac. 1020, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 59
(1913).
'Blair v. Broadwater, 121 Va. 301, 93 S. E. 632, L. R. A. 1918 A, 1011
(1917) ; Jones v. Cook, 90 W. Va. 710, 111 S. E. 828 (1922) ; Tyree v. Tudor,
181 N. C. 214, 106 S. E. 675 (1922).
'Parker v. Wilson, 179 Ala. 361, 60 So. 150, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 87
(1912) ; Spence v. Fisher, 184 Cal., 209, 193 Pac. 255 (1920) ; see also Griffin v.
Russell, 144 Ga. 275, 278, 87 S. E. 10, 11, L. R. A. 1916 F. 216, Ann. Cas. 1917
D. 994 (1915).
'King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 204 S. W. 296 (1918) ; Parker V. Wilson,
179 Ala. 361, 60 So. 150. 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 87 (1912) ; Cohen v. Meador, 119
Va. 429, 89 S. E. 876 (1916) ; McFarlane v. Winters, 47 Utah 598, 155 Pac. 437
(1916) ; Arkin v. Page, 287 Ill. 420, 123 N. E. 30 (1919) ; Jones v. Cook, 90
W. Va. 710, 111 S. E. 828 (1922).
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however, have held that an automobile may become a dangerous in-
strumentality so as to hold the owner liable for his own negligence
in placing it in the hands of one who by reason of his youth, lack of
skill, or want of experience is incompetent to operate it. And at
least in one jurisdiction-Florida-the court has extended the owner's
liability by holding that an automobile is a dangerous instrumentality
in its operation and use so as to make the superior respond in dam-
ages for the negligent acts of persons to whom he has entrusted it
with his consent and permission.10 The theory of the court is that,
in entrusting a servant with a highly dangerous agency, the master
puts it in his servant's power to mismanage it, and so long as it is in
his custody or control under such authority the master should be
responsible for any injury resulting from the servant's negligence.
While the courts have almost unanimously held that an automo-
bile is not per se a dangerous instrumentality, yet we find that the
nature of the automobile has received rather serious consideration
by them in working out the liability of the owner. In one case the
court went so far as to say that the nature of the car should affect
the liability of the owner. We refer to the case of Crittenden v.
Murphy1 (since overruled) in which the court cites with approval
the leadihg case of Birch v. Abercrombie1 2 where the liability of the
car owner was decided on the basis of the "family purpose" doctrine.
In the Crittenden Case the court said:
We are satisfied that the rule was thus laid down not only because
of the fact that the use of the machine by the son for his own pleas-
ure was contemplated when it was purchased, but also because of
the very nature of the automobile itself. While it is true that the
automobile is not in itself a dangerous instrument, nevertheless it
demands a very high degree of care and skill in its management upon
the highway; and it must be recognized, that in the hands of a reck-
less and incompetent youth, it has immense potentiality for harm to
others. Therefore the owner owes the duty to the traveling public to
see to it that his car, when driven on the streets with his permission
and for the purposes for which the car was purchased, should be
driven carefully and with due consideration for their rights; and the
9 Elms v. Flick, 100 Oh. St. 186, 126 N. E. 66 (1919). See also Tyree v.
Tudor 183 N. C. 340, 111 S. E. 714 (1922) ; Daily v. Maxwell, 152 Mo. App.
424, 133 S. W. 353 (1911).
"Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920).
Defendant held liable for injuries negligently inflicted by defendant's employee
while driving defendant's car on business distinctly the employee's.
"36 Cal. App. 803, 173 Pac. 595 (1918).
"74 Wash. 486, 133 Pac. 1020, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 59 (1913).
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owner should not in good conscience be allowed to disclaim his
responsibility on the ground that the use thus contemplated and
authorized by him was permissive only.
In the case of Lewis v. Steele 3 we find the court refusing to con-
cede that the nature of the automobile makes any difference in the
owner's liability. The court said, in part:
Whether these circumstances (under which the action arose)
make a case for the application-of respondeat superior depends upon
considerations entirely beside the fact that the device employed was
an automobile. That instrument is now too well established to be
singled out for judicial preference or animadversion. It has taken
its place among the common methods of transportation, and no good
reason occurs to us, in the absence of legislation, for denying to its
use the same general rules of responsibility, direct and consequential,
as are applicable to other common methods of transportation, having
in mind, of course, its potentialities for harm as well as good.
To the same effect we find the Supreme Court of Utah speaking
in the case of MacFarlane v. Winters:
1 4
If it were assumed that a distinction should be made between
automobiles and other vehicles and instrumentalities, it should be
made by the Legislature, the law-making power, and not by the courts
who merely declare the law as they find it. We, however, can con-
ceive neither reason nor logic in attempting to make such a distinc-
tion. The reciprocal rights and duties of the owners of automobiles
and those who own and use other vehicles on the streets and highways
are now well defined and understood.
The courts, however, are in irreconcilable conflict in their solu-
tion of the general problem. A study of'some of the decisions will
indicate the trend of judicial thought.
We find some of the more conservative courts refusing to recog-
nize the existence of a new problem raised by the family use of the
automobile. They cling tenaciously to the old established principles
of tort liability and refuse to extend or enlarge even by the use of
those principles the car owner's liability. The Virginia court 5 says
that "the only safe course to pursue is to revert to first principles and
adhere to ancient landmarks, rather than to yield a too ready alle-
giance to an admittedly new principle sought to be ingrafted upon the
52 Mont. 300, 157 Pac. 575 (1916).
1447 Utah 598, 155 Pac. 437 (1916).
2 See Blair v. Broadwater, 121 Va. 301, 93 S. E. 632 (1917).
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law of master and servant and principal and agent to meet supposed
exigencies of new conditions incident to the advent of automobiles."
The Alabama court'16 very strongly expresses the opinion that a doc-
trine that would seek to hold the father liable for the negligence of
his minor son while the son was operating the family car for his own
pleasure has no firm foundation in reason or common sense; that in
theory it overlooks well settled principles of law while in practice it
would interdict the father's generosity and his reasonable care for
the pleasure or even the well-being of his children by imposing a
universal responsibility for their acts.17 In the case of Watkins v.
Clark' s8 the Kansas court exhibits no disposition whatsoever to get
aroused to the fact that the advent of the automobile has created any
problem at all. It feels that the notion the courts have of imposing
general liability on the owner of an automobile had its inception in
the days when the automobile was new and there was a tendency to
look upon it as a dangerous thing. The court ridicules the attempts
of other courts to impress liability on the owner of an automobile by
using such devices as "family purpose," "business of the owner,"
"representation," etc., and to thus extend the doctrine of respondeat
superior to fit the situation. It concludes its opinion with the vigor-
ous statement that "the sooner the courts settle down and deal on
the basis of fact and actuality with the vehicle which has revolution-
ized the business and pleasure of the civilized world, the better it
will be not only for society but for the courts."
In other words, the conservative courts say that the particular fact
situation with which they are dealing must fall clearly within the
master and servant or principal and agent category of vicarious liabil-
ity, otherwise they will not hold the automobile owner responsible
for the negligent acts of the member of the family using the car.' 9
Perhaps these courts feel reluctant to extend the already harsh doc-
"' See Parker v. Wilson, 179 Ala. 361, 60 So. 150 (1912)."T o same effect see -Hays v. Hogan, 273 Mo. 1, 200 S. W. 286, L. R. A.
1918 C. 715 (1917).
" 103 Kan. 629, 173 Pac. 131 (1918).
"This conservatism is particularly well set forth in the case of McFarlane
v. Winters, 47 Utah 598, 155 Pac. 437, 439 (1916) as follows: "We think it
may still be safely affirmed that where it is sought to hold one person respon-
sible and civilly liable for the torts committed by another, whether such other
be the child of the owner or a stranger, it must be made to appear by com-
petent evidence that the relationship of principal and agent or that of master
and servant existed between the two at the time the tort was committed, and
in addition to that, that the tortious act complained of was committed in the
course of the employment of the servant, or was within the scope of the
agency."
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trine that renders a master responsible for even the unauthorized acts
of his servant, provided only they were done within the scope of his
employment.
The New York court in Van Blaricom v. Dodgson20 realized and
frankly admitted its limitations in attaching a new tort liability to the
owner of an automobile simply on the theory that a member of the
family in using the car for his own purpose and pleasure was carry-
ing out the purpose for which the car was bought and was therefore
engaged in the business of the owner. judge Hiscock said that if,
contrary to ordinary rules, the owner of a car ought to be responsi-
ble for the carelessness of every one whom he permits to use it in
the latter's own business, that liability ought to be sought by legisla-
tion rather than by some new and anomalous slant applied by the
courts to the principles of agency.
Other courts, which we might designate as the more forward-
looking, have recognized the existence of a very vital problem grow-
ing out of the negligent operation of the family automobile, and have
dared to take a step forward on the basis of settled legal principles
in determining the owner's liability. They have developed what has
come to be known as the "Family Purpose Doctrine."'1 Under this
doctrine the owner of an automobile, which is purchased and main-
tained for the pleasure of his or her family, is held liable for injuries
inflicted by the machine while it is being used by members of the
family for their own pleasure. The theory is that the car is being
used for the purpose or business for which it is purchased and kept,
and the person operating it with the owner's consent express or
implied is, therefore, acting as the owner's agent or servant in using
it.22 These courts seem to start out with the assumption that under
such circumstances there should be an agency or master and servant
relationship between the operator and the owner; then they proceed
to find such a relationship in order to hold the car owner liable.
2 3
- 220 N. Y. 111, 115 N. E. 443 (1917).
"t In Mogle v. Scott, 144 Minn. 173, 174 N. W. 832, 833 (1919), the court
said: "The doctrine is a development of the rules applicable to the relation of
master and servant and principal and agent, which have been extended to meet
a new situation brought about by the invention of the automobile and its com-
mon use, with the owner's permission, by the members of his family for whom
he has provided it."
'Note (1920) 5 A. L. R. 226.
"In Payne v. Leininger, 160 Minn. 76, 199 N. W. 435 (1924), the court
said: "The liability of the owner of an auto for damage done by it rests upon
the doctrine of principal and agent or master and servant. With this doctrine
as a basis the liability of the head of the family for injuries occurring in the
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By the magic art of definition they span the gap from the non-liability
of one person for the acts or omissions of another to the tort liability
of the automobile owner for the negligence of a member of his family
who is neither the agent nor the servant of the owner in any ordinary
sense of the terms. "Purpose" and "business" are the two words
upon which the courts have seized to supply the main supports for
their bridgework. By some means the pleasure of the son must be
made the business of the father so as to hold the father liable.24 To
effectuate this end the judicial mind reasons that where a car is so
provided and maintained by a father for the use of the members of
his family for their pleasure and convenience, he makes that pleasure
and convenience his own "business," and any member of the family
in using the car exclusively for his or her own purposes is carrying
on the business of the father as the father's agent or servant.2 5 By
such reasoning sufficient agency or master and servant relationship
is found to justify placing of liability on the owner.
At this point we might pause to remark that some courts have
refused to follow the family purpose theory of liability for the very
reason that such liability is made to turn on the motive or purpose
for which the car was bought plus its permissive use by the driver,
instead of the fact that at the time of the accident it was being used
in the master's service and under his control-the essential basis of
the liability of a master for the acts of his servant, or of a principal
for the acts of his agent.
26
Some courts, not being willing to shoulder quite all the responsi-
bility, hold that it is a question for the jury whether a machine was
used as a "family car" so as to render the owner liable for its opera-
tion by members of his family under the family car doctrine.
27
Thus we see a group of courts extending, by rather gradual and
experimental steps, the liability of an automobile owner by making
use of the well known doctrine of respondeat superior. They seem
unwilling to break entirely away from the old legal theories, but in
use of an auto kept for the pleasure and use of the family has been accorded a
free and natural development from case to case until we have definitely adopted
the family automobile doctrine."
See (1922) 8 A. B. A. J. 362.
' See Birch v. Abercrombie, 74 Wash. 486, 133 Pac. 1020 (1913); Benton
v. Reseger, 20 Ariz. 273, 179 Pac. 966 (1919), good example of reasoning of
court. See also Spence v. Fisher, 184 Cal. 209, 193 Pac. 255 (1920).
" Doran v. Thomsen, 76 N. J. L. 756, 71 Ati. 296 (1908) ; Elms v. Flick, 100
Oh. St. 186, 126 N. E. 66 (1919); Arkin v. Page, 287 Ill. 420, 123 N. E. 30
(1919).
' Payne v. Leininger, 160 Minn. 75, 199 N. W. 435 (1924).
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reality they are merely justifying by use of existing legal formulae
and rules, the creation-to all practical intents and purposes-of a
new tort liability.
This justification on an agency or master and servant basis is
comparatively easy when a member of the family is driving another
member or guest of the family at the time of the accident. The
courts have generally held the owner liable under such circumstances.
The family driver is readily analogized to the paid chauffeur for
whose negligent driving on such an occasion the owner would clearly
be liable on the respondeat superior doctrine. In other words, in
order to hold the owner liable the courts do not have to stretch a
well-established legal principle so far. They do, however, experience
a real difficulty in justifying their position when a member of the
family is driving alone for his own purposes and pleasure. 28 And
here is where the decisions are in irreconcilable conflict. Some
courts, designated above as the more conservative, refuse absolutely
to hold the owner liable; others, in order to reach a socially desirable
result, practically create a new tort liability, through the medium
of the family purpose doctrine. We may even find an instance where
the same court has held the owner responsible if another member of
the family was being driven in the car at the time of the accident, 29
and has refused to fix responsibility where a member of the family
was driving for his own pleasure or for that of his guests 30
The Tennessee case of King v. Smythe3 1 marks the limit to which
the courts have gone in determining the tort liability of the owner
of an automobile by the extension of a recognized legal principle. In
that case the defendant father was held liable for injuries resulting
to plaintiff from an accident caused by the negligent -driving of de-
fendant's car by his son, aged twenty-five years, who lived with his
father and who was using the car for his own pleasure under the
general permission of his father. The court justifies its decision on
the theory that the son in operating the car for his own pleasure was
carrying out one of the purposes for which it was bought and was
therefore engaged in the father's 'business as his servant or agent.
'-See Johnson v. Smith, 143 Minn. 350, 173 N. W. 677 (1919).
Missell v. Hayes, 86 N. J. L. 348, 91 Atl. 322 (1914) (Minor son driving
his mother and sister).
" Doran v. Thomsen, 76 N. J. L. 756, 71 Atl. 296 (1908) (Daughter driv-
ing her friends for their mutual pleasure).
140 Tenn. 217, 204 S. W. 296, L. R. A. 1918 F. 293.
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However, an examination of the language used by the court will
reveal the real basis of its decision. Said the court:
It is true that an automobile is not a dangerous instrumentality
so as to make the owner liable, as in the case of a wild animal loose
on the streets; but, as a natter of practical justice to those who are
injured, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that an automobile pos-
sesses excessive weight, that it is capable of running at a rapid rate
of speed, and when moving rapidly upon the streets of a populous
city, it is dangerous to life and limb and must be operated with care.
If an instrumentality of this kind is placed in the hands of his family
by a father for the family's pleasure, comfort, and entertainment,
the dictates of natural justice should require that the owner should
be responsible for its negligent operation, because only by doing so,
as a general rule, can substantial justice be attained. A judgment
for damages against an infant daughter or an infant son, or a son
without support and without property, who is living as a member of
the family, would be an empty form. The father, as owner of the
automobile and as head of the family, can prescribe the conditions
upon which it may be run upon the roads and streets, or he can for-
bid its use altogether. He must know the nature of the instrument and
the probability that its negligent operation will produce injury and
damage to others. We think the practical administration of justice
between the parties is more the duty of the court than the preservation
of some esoteric theory concerning the law of principal and agent.82
If owners of automobiles are made to understand that they will be
held liable for injury to persons and property occasioned by their
negligent operation by infants or others who are financially irre-
sponsible, they will doubtless exercise a greater degree of care in
selecting those who are permitted to go upon the public streets with
such dangerous instrumentalities.33
It will thus be seen that the Tennessee court practically admits
that it must disregard fixed rules of law and hold the owner liable
on the ground of the practical administration of justice between the
parties. By reason of the fact that substantial justice demands it, a
new tort liability is imposed upon the owner of the family automobile
so as to make him answerable in damages for the negligence of the
'In the Van Blaricom Case, supra note 20, the New York court had said
that the question whether one person is the agent of another in respect of some
transaction is to be determined by the fact that he represents and is acting for
him rather than by the consideration that it will be inconvenient or unjust if
he is not held to be his agent. The Tennessee court in criticising the reasoning
of the New York court said: "It seems to us that the foregoing reasoning is
more concerned with what the learned court considered pure logic than with
the practical administration of the law."
' The italics in the above excerpts from the opinion are by the author.
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financially irresponsible person to whom he has entrusted the use of
the car. An unusually high degree of care is placed upon the owner
in the selection of those whom he would have operate his automobile.
The court states that an automobile is not a dangerous instrumentality
and yet it predicates its extension of the owner's liability largely upon
the dangerous nature of the automobile. Of course the thought
uppermost in the court's mind was the just compensation of the
injured party.
We also find the Colorado court, in a case decided a year before
the Tennessee case, holding that, if the family car owner were not
responsible in damages, in many instances the injured party would
-be deprived of any remedy, owing to the usual financial irresponsi-
bility of the owner's wife or child who may have been driving the
automobile at the time of the accident; and that in insuring justice
to the injured party, no undue hardship is imposed upon the owner.
8 4
In the case of Goss v. Williams,25 decided in 1928, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina held that the owner of a family purpose
car was liable for the negligence of one sitting beside the owner's
wife and driving the car with the wife's permission. A tenuous
"implied agency" theory was the justification for the result reached
by the court. However, the real basis of the decision is disclosed in
the following language, which is strikingly similar to that used by
the Tennessee court:
Human life is too cheap and restraint is necessary. The numbers
killed and crippled each year are appalling. It is necessary, in reason,
for the courts to hold owners of automobiles, when they turn over
an instrumentality of this kind to the family for family use, to strict
accountability. This is one of the means to safeguard the public.
The head is usually the one of financial responsibility. At least he
is the owner of the instrumentality. Upon the principles cited, con-
sonant with natural justice, he should be held responsible.
The Tennessee, North Carolina, and Colorado courts, emboldened
by the successful use-by other courts-of the family purpose doc-
trine, have dared to take even a further step forward toward a
practical solution of the problem. The influence, particularly of the
Tennessee case, has already been felt in at least one other jurisdiction.
In the case of Arkin v. Page0 decided in 1919-one year after the
"Hutchins v. Haffner, 63 Colo. 365, 167 Pac. 966 (1917).
196 N. C. 213, 145 S. E. 169 (1928).
287 Ill. 420, 123 N. E. 30 (1919).
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Tennessee Case-we find the majority of the Illinois court adhering
to a strict application of the respondeat superior doctrine and refusing
to hold a father liable for the negligence of his twenty year old son
while the son, unknown to the father, was driving the family car to
a distant city to see about registration in a school. The majority
opinion, speaking of the Tennessee court's arghment in King v.
Smythe, said: "This argument may be sound enough, but it has no
application to the doctrine of master and servant." The dissenting
judges show the influence of the King Case when they say in their
opinion: "The only ground upon which it can be said that he (the
father) was not liable for negligence in the operation of the automo-
bile would be that it was none of his affair, which is not only contrary
to the weight of authority, but against the public interest and natural
justice."
Two years later the Illinois court held the father responsible when
his sixteen year old daughter, while driving the family car with a
friend to get the daughter's shoes from a repair shop, negligently
injured the plaintiff. In this case 7 (which upon a close analysis of
its fact situation is difficult to distinguish from the Arkin Case) the
court adopted the view of the dissenting judges in Arkin v. Page
and clearly followed King v. Smythe, the Tennessee case on the
public policy theory. The Illinois court said:
The weight of authority supports the liability of the owner of a
car which is kept for family use and pleasure where an injury is
negligently caused by it while driven by one of his children by his
permission, and the reasoning of those cases seems sound and more
in harmony with principles of justice. We agree with the Supreme
Court of Tennessee that where a father provides his family with an
automobile for their pleasure, comfort, and entertainment, "the dic-
tates of natural justice should require that the owner should be
responsible for its negligent operation, because only by doing so, as
a general rule, can substantial justice be attained."
In connection with the family purpose doctrine, it may be of
interest to note, briefly, how the courts of the same state have handled
the liability of the head of the family for the negligent use of the
family vehicle both in the day when the mode of conveyance was a
horse-drawn vehicle and at the present time when the automobile is
almost universally used for transportation purposes. In the early
" Graham v. Page, 300 Ill. 40, 132 N. E. 817 (1921).
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Kentucky case of Lashbrook v. Patten8 a minor son, while driving
his two sisters to a picnic in his father's carriage drawn by his fa-
ther's horses, and with his father's approbation, through negligence
ran against the carriage of another, causing damage. In holding the
father liable the court said: "The son must be regarded as in the
father's employment, discharging a duty usually performed by a
slave, and therefore must, for the purposes of this suit, be regarded
as his father's servant." This case was cited and followed by the
same court in Stowe v. Morris"9 where the father was held liable on
the ground that the automobile which caused the injury had been
provided for the comfort and pleasure of the family and that the son,
having been given the right to use it, was to be treated as the servant
of his father when operating it for the entertainment of his sister and
her friends. The court, however, failed to note that in the Lashbrook
Case the act was being done not for the pleasure of the child driving
but for the pleasure of some one else, and under the direction and
control of the father.40 It will be seen, therefore, that in the Stowe
Case the Kentucky court went a step further in holding the automo-
bile owner liable because of the fact that the vehicle being used was
the family automobile.
The Maine court has been more consistent. In the case of Mad-
dox v. Brown,41 decided in 1880, a son for purposes of his own, in
the absence of his father and without his knowledge, took his fath-
er's horse and carriage (which he had been allowed to use without
restriction) and left the horse unfastened in the streets; the horse
became frightened, ran away, and the carriage collided with plain-
tiff's, injuring the same. Held: the father was not liable. The plain-
tiff claimed to recover, not on the ground of the parental and filial re-
lation, but because the son in the management of the defendant's team
was his servant and engaged in his business and that defendant was
liable for his negligence. The court said: "The relation of master
and servant must exist at the time of the injury. It cannot be pre-
tended that, under the circumstances stated, the boy was engaged
in the business of his father." In 1920 the Maine court was faced
with the problem of determining the father's liability for his son's
negligent operation of the family automobile, while the son was driv-
'1 Duv. 316 (1864).
147 Ky. 386, 144 S. W. 52 (1912).
"(1923) 2 Wis. L. Rpy. 125.
4171 Me. 432 (1880).
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ing the car in the entertainment of a young lady friend. It was held
that the defendant father was not liable since tjiere was no relation
of agency or master and servant arising from the son's permissive
use of defendant's car for his exclusive pleasure and purpose. The
court in this case4 2 said: "Before motor cars as now known were
invented, a case involving the same principle arose in this State."
(The court had reference to the case of Maddox v. Brown, which it
cited and followed as a precedent.) It felt that the son's operation of
the family automobile for his own pleasure could no more be made
the "business" of the father than could the driving of the family
horse and buggy under like circumstances.
Perhaps we might safely generalize to the effect that before the
automobile became the most used vehicle in travel the head of the
family was not held liable for the wrongful acts of his relatives
when the acts were not authorized by him, had no connection with
his business, were not ratified by him and from which he received
no benefit.
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That the courts should use well-established legal principles as a
basis for augmenting the car owner's liability seems most natural
and logical. However, much violence may have been done by them
to the doctrine of respondeat superior in formulating the family pur-
pose doctrine, their course of action is to be commended rather than
criticised in view of the desirability of the result reached. Perhaps
it may be said that the same desirable end could have been attainel
and with less embarrassment, if the courts, instead of using the
agency camouflage to give stability to the family purpose doctrine,
had adopted the policy of the Florida court and had held that a
motor vehicle is an inherently dangerous instrumentality in its use
and operation.
In our discussion thus far we have attempted to trace, through
the medium of judicial decision, the growth and extension of an
automobile owner's liability. The major steps in the study have
brought us from the point where-nothing else appearing-the owner
is not liable for the acts or omissions of another; thence to his re-
sponsibility for the acts of his servants or agents in the course of
their employment or within the scope of their agency; thence to his
'Pratt v. Cloutier, 119 Me. 203, 110 Atl. 353 (1920).
" (1924) 11 VA. L. REv. 130; Baker v. Haldeman, 24 Mo. 219, 69 Am, Dec.
430 (1857); Edwards v. Crume, 13 Kan. 348 (1874); Moon v. Towers, 8 C. B.
(N. S.) 611, 141 Eng. Rep. 1306 (1860); see also Brohl v. Lingeman, 41
Mich. 711 (1879) ; Ricci v. Mueller, 41 Mich. 214 (1879).
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liability for the negligence of members of his family under the family
purpose doctrine-with the Tennessee court stretching the doctrine
to its limit on the ground of public policy. Then we have seen the
position of the Florida court which makes the mere ownership of
an instrumentality like the automobile, plus its permissive-use and
operation, the basis of liability. The courts have gone about as far
as they have dared; but they have crystallized the problem and have
furnished an adequate background and basis for legislative action.
We have said that the third possible solution of the problem was
to leave it to the legislature. In view of the growing sentiment that
persons injured by the negligent operation of automobiles in the
hands of financially irresponsible persons should, at all events, be
given some recourse against the owner of the car, the legislatures of
several states have passed laws extending and enlarging the common
law tort liability of the automobile owner. But just as we have seen
that the extension of this liability by the courts was a rather slow and
painful process, so must we realize that legislation in this new field
must be, to a great extent, experimental at first, and that it must
develop step by step as time sheds new light on the problem. And
furthermore, such legislation must be subjected to judicial construc-
tion, both with reference to its constitutionality and its applicability
to particular fact situations.
For the purposes of the present discussion the writer will con-
sider the statutory enactments of but one or two jurisdictions. To
do more would be but to duplicate the splendid effort of Professor
Lattin, who, in a recent article44 tabulated and analyzed the statutes
passed by the various states in connection with the liability of the
family automobile owner.
In 1909 the Michigan Legislature attempted to charge the owner
of an automobile with liability for all injuries occasioned by the
negligence of the driver of the machine, except in case it was
stolen. 45 But the statute was held unconstitutional as depriving the
owner of his property without due process of law-by an invalid
exercise of the police power-in so far as it attempted to impose
liability where a trespasser obtained possession of the car without
" Vicarious Liability and the Family Automobile, (1928) 26 MIcH. L. Fv.,
846, 869 et seq.
' Mich. P. A., 1909, Act no. 318, §10, s. s. 3. See also Johnson v. Sergeant,
168 Mich. 444, 134 N. W. 468 (1912).
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the consent of the owner and without his fault.40 A subsequent
statute passed in 191547 cured the defect of the former law by pro-
viding that the owner would not be liable unless at the time of the
injury the motor vehicle was being driven with his express or im-
plied consent or knowledge.48  This later statute has been held con-
stitutional, although it imposes a liability on the owner greater than
that allowed by the common law, as, for example, rendering him
responsible for negligence in the operation of the machine when it
is loaned to another.4 9 In order to provide for the family automo-
bile problem the 1915 statute expressly provides that if the vehicle
was driven at the time of the accident by an immediate member of
the owner's family, it shall be conclusively presuned that it was being
driven with the knowledge and consent of such owner. In 1927,
however, the statute was amended, the word "conclusive" being
omitted. 50 Again, in 1929,51 the Michigan legislature amended the
law by adding a proviso to the effect that no person transported by
the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest without pay-
ment for such transportation should have an action for damages
against such owner or operator unless the accident resulting in death
or injury to the guest shall have been caused by the gross negligence
or wilful and wanton misconduct of the owner or operator and that
such negligence or misconduct contributed to the alleged injury or
death.
It is interesting to note these stages of statutory growth as evi-
dence of the legislature's effort to cope with the problem created by
the advent of the automobile.
By judicial construction of the Michigan statute, liability is also
imposed on the owner when the machine is driven by a member of
the owner's family although against his express orders and direc-
SDaugherty v. Thomas, 174 Mich. 371, 140 N. W. 615, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.)
699 (1913). In this case defendant left his car at a garage to be repaired and
plaintiff was injured by negligence of two repairmen while testing the car.
The court said: "It may be laid down as a general proposition that absolute
liability, without fault on his part, cannot ordinarily be imposed upon a
citizen."
"Mich. P. A., 1915, Act. no. 302, §29.
' Cf. with the effect of this statute the rule of liability laid down by the
Florida court in Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, supra note 10.
' Stapleton v. Independent Brewing Co., 198 Mich. 170, 164 N. W. 520
L. R. A. 1918 A. 916 (1917). See also Hatter v. Dodge Bros., 202 Mich. 97,
167 N. W. 935 (1918).
1 Mich. P. A. 1927, No. 56, §29, p. 67.1 Mich. P. A. 1929, No. 19, §29, p. 44.
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tions. 52  "Knowledge or consent of the owner" has been construed
in the case of Union Trust Co. v. American Commercial Car Co.,53
where the owner of a truck loaned its use until 6:00 P.M. to an-
other, and after that hour an employee of the bailee, without the
knowledge or consent of his employer or of the owner, used the
truck for his own private purposes. It was held that the owner was
not liable for injuries occasioned while it was being so used. It has
also been held that this statute was not so intended to operate as to
hold one joint owner of an automobile liable for the negligence of
another joint owner while the latter was using the car in the prose-
cution of his own business.54
As the Michigan statute now stands, it makes the automobile
owner a virtual insurer. He is personally liable "where the car is
in any one's hands with his permission express or implied, and
through that person's wilful or negligent act, damage arises." 55
In 1924 the New York legislature provided that every owner
of a motor vehicle operated upon a public highway should be liable
and responsible:for death or injuries to person or property resulting
from negligence in the operation of such motor vehicle, in the busi-
ness of such owner or otherwise, by any person legally using or
operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such
owner. It is clear that by this statute the liability of the owner of
the family automobile is definitely fixed. The constitutionality of
the statute has been sustained.5 6 It applies whether at the time of
"Hawkins v. Ermatinger, 211 Mich. 578, 179 N. W. 249, 251 (1920). It is
interesting to compare with the language used by the Tennessee court in King
v. Smythe,-in which the court extended, on the grounds of substantial justice
to the injured party and without legislative aid, the car owner's liability,-the
language of the Michigan court in the construction of the statute in its applica-
tion to the facts of the Ermatinger case. In the latter case the court said:
"The owner of such a vehicle has complete dominion over it and the absolute
right of control thereof. He may, if he will, retain its possession and so
prevent its use by persons other than careful, experienced operators. The
legislature may impose upon him the obligation to do so as a legal duty. It has
determined, in its judgment, that the most practical way in which it can com-
pel the performance of such duty is to provide for his personal liability for
damages occasioned thereby. The purpose of the act in this respect is not to
provide a cause of action which did not exist before, but to protect the public
in the use of the streets and highways. . . . It simply insures to the injured
party a right of action against a party presumoably able to respond in damages
therefor." (Italics ours).
"219 Mich. 557, 189 N. W. 23 (1922).
Mittelstadt v. Kelly, 202 Mich. 524, 168 N. W. 501 (1918).
Laws of N. Y., 1924, c. 534, § 282-e.
'Dawley v. McKibben, 245 N. Y. 557 (1927): Brooks v. McNutt Auto.
Delivery Co., 126 Misc. 730 (N. Y. 1926).
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the accident in question the machine was operated by. the bailee or
by some driver selected by him.57 The owner, however, is not re-
sponsible for the acts of one whom the bailee permits to use the car
without the knowledge of the owner.58
As an illustration of how a general statutory enactment may be
subsequently modified and limited because of pressure brought to
bear upon the legislature by certain persons or commercial interests
adversely affected by the general statute, we find the New York
statute amended in 1925 and 19265) to the extent that a conditional
sales vendor (or his assignee) who has retained the title to' a motor
vehicle sold under a conditional sales contract shall not be deemed
an owner under the statute but that the vendee or his assignee shall
be deemed the owner, notwithstanding the terms of the contract,
until the vendor or his assignee shall retake possession of the vehicle.
It is also provided that a chattel mortgagee of a motor vehicle out
of possession is not an owner within the purview of the statute. It
is obvious that such modifications of the statute were brought about
through the influence of automobile dealers and credit men, the
great volume of whose business in motor vehicles is transacted on a
credit basis by means of conditional sales contracts and chattel mort-
gage security. They did not wish to assume responsibility as owners
(as imposed by the statute) for the operation of the thousands of
cars sold by them; their position is entirely justifiable. In 1928 a
further amendment to the statute 0 exempts from its operation that
class of persons, like the "U-Drive-It" people, who are engaged in
the business of renting cars for hire and placing the operation thereof
in the hands of the bailee; provided, however, that the bailor must
carry liability insurance insuring the renter against liability arising
out of his negligent operation of the car. Under such circumstances
the bailor is not an owner within the statute.
Thus we see how, both in Michigan and in New York, legislation
with reference to the liability of an automobile owner is still passing
through the experimental stages. The courts, too, are still engaged
in construing the statutes in their application to particular fact situ-
ations. In Cohen v. Neustadter8 ' the New York court held that the
statute applies where a guest of the person who is driving by the
" Feitelberg v. Matuson, 208 N. Y. Supp. 786 (Mun. Ct. 1925).
Owen v. Gruntz, 216 App. Div. 19 (N. Y. 1926).
Laws of N. Y. 1925, c. 167, §282-c; Laws of N. Y.. 1926. c. 730, §282-e.
' Laws of N. Y. 1928, c. 508, §282-c.
"247 N. Y. 207, 160 N. E. 12 (1928).
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owner's permission is injured by the driver's negligence. In a recent
case 2 it was held by the Michigan court, that under the "conclusive
presumption" statute a defendant would not be liable for injuries
caused by the negligent operation of defendant's car by his nephew
who was employed by defendant and roomed at his house. The car
had been placed in dead storage whence it was taken without the
owner's consent or knowledge. Here is limitation by judicial de-
cision of a rather strict statutory liability.68
The type of legislation illustrated by the New York and Michigan
statutes is, according to Professor Lattin, "the most efficient, and the
one which goes farthest in the direction of vicarious liability; it puts
an almost absolute liability on the owner who places the car in the
hands of a member of his family or a third party." Two other types
of statutes in force are designated by Professor Lattin as: (1) "The
type which gives a lien on the car causing the injury, where the
vehicle is operated in violation of the provisions of the law, or negli-
gently and carelessly, except where the car has been stolen and the
thief caused the injury. (2) The type that prohibits minors under a
certain age from driving, and perhaps allows them after a certain
age to drive, but only where granted a driver's license; the parents
or guardian or other person in charge, perhaps, being required to
sign the application for the license, and being made jointly and sev-
erally liable for injuries occasioned by the negligent driving of the
minor.""4
Another type of legislation, now in force in ten states of the
Union (California, 65 Connecticut,66 Maine, 67 Minnesota,68 New
Hampshire,6 9 New Jersey,7 0 New York,7 1 Rhode Island,7 2 Ver-
mont7 3 and Wisconsin*4 ), requires compulsory insurance by owners
of automobiles, so as to insure financial responsibility in the event
Rogers v. Kuhnreich, 225 N. W. 622 (Mich. 1929).
"See comment on this case (1929) 28 MIcH. L. REv. 73.
"See (1928) 26 MicH. L. Rv. 869; statutes illustrative of these types
of legislation cited in notes 72, 73, and 74 of Prof. Lattin's article, supra
note 44. For a recent discussion of legislation in this field, see W. J. Heyting,
Automobiles and Vicarious Liability (1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 225.
"Stat. of Cal., 1929, c. 259, p. 563.
"Conn. P. A. 1927, c. 161, p. 4242.
"Laws of Maine 1929, c. 209, p. 169.
"Mason's Minn. Stat., 1927, §2720-61, subd. (b).
N. H. Laws, 1927, c. 54, p. 64.
N. J. Laws, 1929, c. 116, p. 195.
'Laws of N. Y., 1929, c. 695.
" R. I. Acts and Resolves, 1929, c. 1429, p. 346.
"Laws of Vermont, 1927, No. 81, p. 74.
"Wis. Laws, 1925, c. 94.
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of the recovery of a judgment against them for personal injuries or
death. Legislation of this sort tends to increase the financial re-
sponsibility of the owner or driver after his first accident. "The
fully developed laws of this kind follow either the Connecticut plan,
the American Automobile Association Safety Responsibility plan or
the Stone plan, sponsored by Edward C. Stone of the Employer's
Insurance Company. Under all these proof of financial responsi-
bility by insurance policy, surety bond, or the deposit of cash or col-
lateral is required only from those xwho have been involved in an
accident or have been convicted of violating a motor vehicle law.
Under the Connecticut plan this proof of responsibility is required
only with respect to future accidents, while under the American
Automobile Association and Stone plans the motor license is re-
voked until proof of responsibility is given with respect to the acci-
dent which has already happened."1 5
The tort liability of the owner of an automobile has been greatly
enlarged, and justifiably so, through substantive law changes brought
about by judicial decision and legislative enactment. The courts
have, through the Family Purpose Doctrine, extended the principle
of irspondeat superior so as. to make the owner of a motor vehicle
responsible, without the ordinary limitations of agency law, where
the vehicle is being operated with his consent, express or implied.
The legislatures have approved the results reached by the courts by
definite statutory enactments that have the same or a similar effect
on the owner's liability. We have pointed out the further legislative
tendency at present to increase the owner's financial responsibility
by means of compulsory insurance statutes. It will be noticed, how-
ever, that the statutes, as well as the judicial decisions, leave negli-
gence-coupled with the permissive use of the car-as the basis of
liability. The injured party must still bring suit in court and estab-
lish by adequate proof, before he can recover a judgment, that the
injury was caused by the negligence of the driver of the car. Thou-
sands of cases brought by those injured, or by the legal represent-
atives of those killed in automobile accidents, must continue to clog
"'16 A. B. A. J. 99 (Feb. 1930). See also W. H. Elsbree and H. C.
Roberts, Comnpalsory Insurance Against Motor Vehicle Accidents (1928) 76
U. PA. L. REV. 690; Harry J. Loman, Compulsory Automobile Inmrance,
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March, 1927.
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the dockets of the courts. Litigants must be subjected to legal ex-
pense and delay, uncertainty, and the lack of uniformity in juries'
verdicts. Has the problem become so acute and pressing as to call
for legislation that would -place upon the owner of a motor vehicle
liability without fault?
It has been suggested that:
"The most effective method of dealing with the problem would be
to extend the principle of the Workmen's Compensation Law to cover
motor vehicle accidents. Every owner of a motor vehicle, as a con-
dition of obtaining a license to operate what courts have deemed to
be a dangerous instrumentality over the public highways, would be
required to provide compensation for the disability or death of any
person, caused by an injury arising from the use or operation of a
motor vehicle on the public highway without regard to fault as a
cause of injury, except when solely occasioned by the intoxication
of the injured person, or by his wilful intention to bring about injury
to himself or another. The provisions of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Law relative to insurance, informal administration by a board
or commission, medical treatment, payment up to a stated maximum
amount for disability or death, according to fixed schedules, would
be applicable to motor vehicle accidents. The proposal is fraught
with difficulties, actuarial, administrative and legal, which demand
impartial, expert study at the hands of a Commission. '7 6
A voluntary commission, known as the Committee to Study Com-
pensation for Automobile Accidents, and composed of eminent
judges, lawyers, and law school teachers, has already begun the work
of preparing and publishing an impartial study of the questions re-
lating to the compensation and financial protection of persons injured
by motor vehicles. 77 The results of the investigation of this com-
mittee and any solution of the problem which it may propose will be
awaited with keenest interest. The day does not seem far distant
when the owner of an automobile will be called upon to assume com-
plete responsibility for death or injury caused by his machine, re-
gardless of any question of fault. That such responsibility will be
" Shientag, Motor Vehicle Accidents and the Law (April, 1929) 1 NEw
YORK STATE BAR AssoCIATIoN BULLETIN, 134, 140 and 141.
For a discussion of the essential features of such a proposed act, see W. H.
Elsbree and H. C. Roberts, Compulsory Insurance Against Motor Vehicle Acci-
dents, op. cit., supra note 75.
For an interesting statement of the problem involved and of the proposed
work of the committee, see Ballantine, A Study of Compensation for Automo-
bile Accidents (Feb. 1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 97.
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imposed by legislation formulated along the lines of the Workmen's
Compensation Law seems almost inevitable.
78
"There is now pending before the Legislature of Massachusetts an "Act
to Create a Motor Vehicle Insurance Fund for the Purpose of Providing Com-
pensation for Injuries and Deaths Due to Motor Vehicle Accidents," H. B.
No. 202; see (1930) 15 MAss. LAW QUARTERLY (Supplement, Feb. 1). In gen-
eral, it provides for the creation of a commission to administer a general fund
to which the owners of motor vehicles must contribute certain sums before they
will be allowed to register and operate said vehicles; and if such contribution
is made, the commission agrees to insure and indemnify the owner of the vehicle
against damages up to certain amounts. The commission has the right to settle
out of the fund all claims against the assured.
